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 ABSTRACT  
To assure the reliability of results, design research has often adopted the 
methods of other disciplines, reproducing the exterior shape of scientific 
research rather than its deeper grounds. Design academics often imitate what 
scientific disciplines do when they do research (i.e. applying codified methods), 
yet the discussion about why such disciplines behave that way is still limited.  
Basing on science studies, we argue that what determines research findings' 
validity may not just be the application of research methods but the consensus 
of a community, which lets new knowledge claims enter what we refer to as the 
Great Archive of Science (GAS). By analysing the dynamics of the GAS, we show 
that the rules, methods, and models typical of the research environment have as 
their main purpose to make the reliability of researchers’ knowledge claims as 
durable as possible. 
Regarding design research, we thus argue that what turns designers’ work into 
research is not just the application of scientific methods but primarily the 
participation in the grand game of the GAS, whose dynamics enable a relatively 
circumscribed corpus of knowledge to be held reliable and durable by a 
community. Relying on this argument, we seek to explore how design, while 
remaining a planning endeavour, may at the same time become an activity of 
knowledge production, which is the essential feature of research itself.   
Keywords: design research, research through design, research epistemology, 
scientific method, design knowledge  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Several years’ debate about design research has brought to light the multiplicity 
of activities lumped under this umbrella concept (Frayling, 1993; Jonas, 2004; 
Krippendorff, 2007; Grand and Jonas, 2012; Rodgers and Yee, 2015) 1.   
In general, the concept of design research, especially in the case of research 
through design, implies that it is possible “for designers to produce knowledge 
based on the skills and capacities of the design field itself” (Bang et al. 2011, 2).  
Yet in applying that idea, the theory and practice of design research have often 
simply attempted to reproduce the model of codified scientific research (Crouch 
and Pearce, 2012; Koskinen et al. 2011; Saikali 2003). The question we want to 
raise is whether conforming to the model of codified scientific research is an 
appropriate way for design research to mature into a useful, meaningful, and 
fully enfranchised discipline. 
                                               
1 The debate on design research focused first and foremost on analyzing the many ways in which we 
can speak of research in the context of design; see Rampino and Colombo (2012) for a thorough 
reconstruction. 
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We believe that to answer such question we must delve into the way design 
makes the model of codified scientific research its own. For, in our view, this 
bears the risk of taking what has historically been the exterior shape of scientific 
research – i.e. the form of some standardized methods – instead of its profound 
social reasons as the model.  
Design-research theory often strives to appropriate methods that have been 
developed and codified in consolidated disciplines so as to then apply them to 
design activity (Laurel, 2003; Crouch and Pearce, 2012; Krippendorff, 2006). In 
this approach, there seems to be an attempt to imitate what other scientific 
fields do when they do research and to understand how they behave, without 
asking why they behave that way. 
In this work we try to ask the why. And, to do so, we will set off from science as 
a social activity, as a set of people who act according to established behaviour 
models, thus starting from science-in-action (Latour, 1987) rather than relying 
on established epistemological theories. The question is no small matter; for 
understanding the deep social reasons, underlying the ideals and practices of 
scientific research helps to focus on how those deep reasons can bear 
themselves out in the field of design, irrespective of established methods. 
2 THE GAS TANK 
In order to understand why scientific research employs codified methods, it is 
helpful to focus on scientists’ practice of publishing their research findings. This 
involves a first shift of focus. When reflecting on a scientist’s activity, we 
suggest to focus not on the knowledge he/she produces, which is something 
very vague and intangible, impossible to determine in a naturalistic attitude 
(Bloor 1976), but rather on knowledge claims: statements conveyed through 
oral (e.g. conferences) or written (e.g. journal articles) communication.  
John Ziman (2000, p.34) notes that the scientists’ habit to claim knowledge, 
mainly in written form, has led to a “notional archive” of scientific knowledge 
that is “absolutely enormous”. Paolo Volonté (2012) calls this the Great Archive 
of Science (GAS). It consists of the entirety of scientific literature: books, 
journals, and data published online. But the larger an archive, the less 
accessible it is in practice. The Great Archive of Science therefore has an 
apparently contradictory feature: on the one hand, it is where knowledge claims 
are preserved from oblivion and handed down from one generation to the next, 
as well as the place where new claims are made public; on the other, owing to 
its immensity, it is also the ‘graveyard’ of scientific discoveries – or would be, 
were there not a meticulous system for classifying and retrieving the archive’s 
knowledge claims. 
There actually is such a system. It consists of library catalogs, book indexes, 
Internet search engines, and especially that portion of the GAS known as 
‘secondary literature,’ which makes up the bulk of the GAS. Secondary literature 
is a body of knowledge claims about other knowledge claims, where the latter 
are judged, evaluated, selected, and combined. The GAS acts as if it consisted of 
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two elements, a heavier GAS made up of knowledge claims about ‘reality’2 and a 
lighter GAS made up of knowledge claims about knowledge claims. 
Secondary literature is what prevents the enormity of the GAS from turning into 
a graveyard for knowledge claims. However, it cannot save all claims. The 
majority of the knowledge claimed since throughout science began now lies 
buried and forgotten in the GAS. Only some of it has survived: the knowledge 
taken up by new knowledge claims. Although it is customary to think that 
scientific knowledge is known and shared because it is true, this is a naïve 
simplification. The other way round is valid: knowledge is considered true when 
it is shared. We believe E=mc2 not because it is ‘true’ (in fact we believe in a 
deal of claims that turn out to be false) neither because Einstein said so (few of 
us have ever read Einstein’s papers), but because others have since argued 
persuasively that Einstein’s equation is reliable. As a matter of fact such 
reliability could rest on a variety of different and inscrutable causes, some of 
them epistemologically legitimate (personal experience, consistency), others 
more disputable (prejudice, social convenience), but in all cases it is the web of 
references and citations that in the end saves a knowledge claim from the 
oblivion. The secondary literature therefore bears the responsibility of selecting 
what part of the GAS will continue to be available – because considered reliable 
- over time. 
We can imagine the GAS behaving like in a huge imaginary tank. New claims 
enter from the top and lie on the surface, at first, but soon begin to sink 
inexorably to the bottom, where they are submerged by new claims and form a 
thick layer of inert sediment. Every scientific knowledge claim is fated for 
oblivion in the dregs of the GAS unless new knowledge claims intervene by 
declaring it reliable, thus bringing it back to the surface. And these new claims 
will start to sink, too, their fate hanging on yet more new claims. Thus, the GAS 
is animated by the knowledge claims scientists constantly advance, not just 
claims about reality but especially second-order claims. Absent the latter, the 
former would be destined to lie forever at the bottom of the GAS, which largely 
consists of claims that have simply been forgotten.   
Collective memory, one might say, is the driving principle of science. The prima 
facie validity of research findings is determined not by research methods but by 
the consensus of a community of scientists. Methods are tools to achieve such 
consensus. Indeed, the materials deposited in the GAS tank are constantly 
filtered through those processes of intersubjective communication and 
evaluation that Robert Merton (1957, p. 560) called “organized skepticism”. 
Two instruments are widely used in scientific practice to enhance a knowledge 
claim’s chance to survive within the GAS tank: referencing and peer reviewing.  
References and citations form a web of knowledge claims that strengthen each 
other. Individual scientists use them mainly as a heuristic means to avoid 
constantly having to survey the entire gamut of knowledge on which their own 
new knowledge claims are based. Citations thus provide knowledge claims 
admitted to the GAS with specific locations, tying new claims’ reliability to the 
reliability of their cited sources. Were the theory of relativity eventually to lose 
favor in the community, it would drag all related knowledge claims toward 
                                               
2 We use the very general term ‘reality’ to denote everything that is not a claim: facts, objects, events, 
natural laws, etc. This simplification is needed to allow a plain exposition of our point. 
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obscurity at the bottom of the GAS. However, every new citation also reinforces 
the reliability of the claim being cited. A reference to Einstein means his 
demonstration was deemed reliable once more, further reinforcing its reliability 
in the eyes of other scientists and bringing it closer to the surface of the GAS.  
The citation system is thus not only useful to the individual researcher but also a 
structural component of the scientific method. 
Peer review is a key feature of scientific research too. To gain admittance to the 
GAS, any knowledge claim must first be scrutinized by ‘well-informed 
colleagues.’ The reason is that, to be claimed in public, a piece of scientific 
knowledge must go through a communication medium.  A speech at Speakers’ 
Corner is not enough. Yet any medium has to have gatekeepers. Gatekeepers in 
media are those entitled to decide what can be published, and how (White, 
1950). Science has institutionalized this general rule by making it part of 
required method: gatekeepers are scientists and make decisions based on 
scientific criteria while eschewing political, editorial, academic or other such 
criteria. As a result, the reliability of any new knowledge claim admitted to the 
GAS has already been somehow vetted. It is in this process that research 
methods become important. Before submitting a knowledge claim to a 
gatekeeper, scientists meticulously refine it to forestall any possible criticism 
from referees. Were there no peer-review process, scientists would probably 
give much less importance to research methods. The need to withstand informed 
criticism is a constraint on the upstream phases of research that forces them to 
rigorously comply with the rules of method. 
In sum, we argue that the purpose of all research’s characteristic methods and 
behavior models is basically to solidify knowledge claims to the greatest possible 
degree (Latour, 1987, p.22-29), i.e. to make them last as long as they can. 
More precisely, the ability of a piece of knowledge to endure depends on the 
reliability of the corresponding claim acknowledged by the community. In the 
precipitating dynamics of the GAS, a knowledge claim can last only thanks to the 
‘collaboration’ of players who see in its re-employment a chance to solidify their 
own claims, because they acknowledge its potential to last. Therefore, each 
researcher seeks the willingness of others to place their own trust in what she or 
he has claimed, to believe in it, and to invest their credibility in it. Scientific 
research developed all its quirks, obsessions, canons, and precepts in response 
to the constraints imposed by the GAS as a collective tool for selecting 
knowledge that promises to endure in the long run. 
3 PRODUCING DESIGN KNOWLEDGE 
Having highlighted what we consider the foundations of research-in-action in the 
world of science, we put forward the thesis that the same foundations can justify 
the idea of a design research, and especially of research through design3 
                                               
3 Indeed, it is our opinion that scholars who deal with design as an object of study (research into 
design) generally stand on the solid ground of some established, codified discipline: no one calls into 
question the legitimacy of their hewing an ideal of scientific research, especially that of social science. 
On the other hand, research for design, i.e. research at the service of the design profession (Buchanan 
2001), presents a rather more complex case, but is a niche whose focus we can nevertheless say “is 
still on design as a practice and not as a research discipline that makes contributions of knowledge” 
(Zimmerman, Forlizzi, and Evenson 2007, 496). For this reason, we wish to concentrate on research 
through design, for it is here that we find the research design produces.    
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(Frayling 1993). This means that if design research is to exist enfranchised and 
freed from the risk of science’s ‘colonization of design discourse’ (Krippendorff, 
1995, p.7), design research has to avoid a mere reproduction of other 
disciplines’ research methods. Rather, it has to produce an archive of knowledge 
that is lent a certain reliability by the fact that many believe in it and 
presumably will do so in the future. In other words, the aim of design research 
should be to fit certain claims of knowledge into an interplay of claims analogous 
to the fluid dynamics of the GAS.   
But what does it mean, in practice, for the design field to “claim knowledge”?  
This question has already drawn the attention of several scholars (e.g.: 
Buchanan, 2001, p.13-17; Friedman, 2001; Friedman 2003; Cross 2007) who 
noticed the twofold characteristics of design knowledge. On the one hand, it 
often inhabits a nonverbal dimension (Mareis, 2012, p.63) that makes it a kind 
of tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). On the other hand, various observers insist 
on the need for design-research projects to be accompanied and wrapped up by 
verbal texts, articles, dissertations, and the like (Findeli, 1998; Schneider, 2007; 
Bonsiepe, 2007). The research-through-design process can thus be seen as 
characterized by two different forms of output: “a concrete problem framing” 
and “a series of artefacts – models, prototypes, products” (Zimmerman, Forlizzi 
and Evenson 2007, p.497). These two kinds of output seem to be intrinsically 
correlated; for, together, they may represent two complementary facets of the 
same knowledge outcome. 
Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson’s “problem framing” may become concrete in 
a “theory on design” (often in the form of new frameworks) or, more often, in a 
“theory for design” (Zimmerman, Stolterman and Forlizzi 2010, p.313) in the 
form of implications, of guidelines, of “design specifications for future products” 
(Frens 2007, p.140) or of new design processes and methods. But, in research 
through design, such verbal knowledge claims are typically made possible and 
validated by the existence of one or more artefacts that embody and exemplify 
them (Mareis 2012, p.67): knowledge generated thus bases itself on producing 
“design exemplars” (Zimmerman and Forlizzi 2008) or “epistemic objects” 
(Mareis 2012), in the form of artefacts that “can be seen as the solid form of 
knowledge to be disseminated” (Bang et al. 2012, p.7). 
The design artefacts’ ability of bearing new knowledge becomes clearer when we 
compare them with art objects. Scrivener (2002) points out that in order to be 
bearers of new knowledge, art objects lack “consistency of interpretation.”  In 
fact, when faced with an objet d’art, each of us feels emotions and sensations 
that remain personal, that are not necessarily the same as someone else’s, 
whereas what Scrivener calls knowledge artefacts, such as a subway map, for 
example, can produce congruent interpretations in different people. 
This distinction should not be overemphasized, since scientific research can 
certainly fail to produce consistent interpretations in the community of scientists.  
However, it does throw light on an essential difference between two archetypes 
of knowledge embodied in objects. A design artefact, too, in acting as a source 
of formal and aesthetic inspiration for other designers, is undoubtedly subject to 
personal interpretation.  Nevertheless, it is not perfectly analogous to an art 
object.  For, while the latter has no cogent relationship to the range of what is 
technically possible (Ezio Manzini, cited by Verganti 2002, p.14), a design 
artefact also embodies a new technical possibility.  In this regard, a design 
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artefact is similar to an engineering prototype that communicates – implicitly but 
unequivocally – a possible (technical) solution to a certain problem.  Said 
solution, whose feasibility is proven by the prototype, has a consistency of 
interpretation from which the art object is precluded.  As a result, the prototype 
generated by research through design, unlike the art object, may be the bearer 
of “exemplary” (Binder and Redström 2006) knowledge – not only about the 
technical possibilities but also about possibilities for use – that can be 
transferred to other designers (professionals or researchers), as well as to 
researchers from other disciplines. “People working on related research topics”, 
remarks Stappers (2007, 87), “should be exposed to the prototypes, so that 
they may learn solutions even if these are not made explicit”. 
As the main point of this discussion we would like to stress that, although the 
two products of research through design (the artefact and explicit knowledge) 
may even meet different fates once they have been admitted to the GAS, they 
must be admitted together. For, on the one hand, no claim of new knowledge 
generated by this kind of research can stand, unless it is supported and 
demonstrated by the existence of a design outcome – a model, prototype or 
concept – since otherwise it would not be a matter of research through design.  
On the other hand, to be qualified as design research result, the design outcome 
itself is not sufficient, but it must be accompanied with the designer’s reflection 
on his/her work (Bonsiepe 2007, 29) and a statement of the results of that 
reflection that can be re-used by someone else. 
Once such knowledge has been admitted to the GAS, other researchers will have 
access to it not only by following Ariadne’s clew of verbal claims and citations 
but also through a ‘knowledge bearer’ in a class of its own: the artefact, whose 
existence is witnessed through images (in printed publications), by models (in 
conferences) or even directly.  
Recent years have seen the design-research world moving in precisely this 
direction, both with the rise of journals dedicated to the findings of research- 
through-design (the International Journal of Design, for example) and with 
certain changes in the structure of design conferences. One example that may 
stand for all is the recent founding of the Research Through Design Conference, 
where “submissions are taking the form of an artefact (exhibited at the 
conference) accompanied by a commentary paper.” Once again, presenting a 
research prototype is inseparable from making an explicit claim of knowledge.  
What we argue is that, without that claim, the gatekeepers would not have the 
tools required to gauge whether said prototype, as the product of a research 
process, may actually be admitted to the GAS. 
This ushers in a final issue we must deal with: By what criteria can the dual 
results of research through design (artefacts and knowledge claims) be deemed 
worthy or unworthy of admittance to the GAS?  
4 CRITERIA FOR ENFRANCHISED DESIGN 
RESEARCH  
Several authors have already taken up the issue of design research assessment. 
From our standpoint, one especially interesting contribution comes from 
Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson (2007, p.499-500), who propose evaluating 
research through design by referring to four criteria: process, invention, 
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relevance, and extensibility. This section analyzes these criteria in detail vis-à-
vis what we have argued up to now.  
To begin with, Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson believe it necessary for the 
designer-researcher to recount the process through which certain knowledge 
was generated, the reasons for choosing to employ certain methods, and the 
rigor they were applied with. Although we have observed that methods are not 
what primarily determines the soundness of research in general, describing the 
process through which certain knowledge was generated is a sine qua non for 
lending the claim reliability in the eyes of others. The reason for this is that 
reliability of a given claim depends crucially on the trust of people other than the 
one who originally advanced it that the claim is ripe to be made their own. It 
must, however, be added that the need of recounting the process is not 
symmetrically true for the explicit claim of knowledge and the outcome of the 
designing. The first is produced by the process of inquiry outright, which sets out 
from a research question whose answer the researcher seeks to define an 
appropriate research strategy for. As noted, to lend reliability to the knowledge 
the researcher-designer claims to have generated, said process has to be 
documented and described in detail. The design outcome, be it a concept or a 
prototype, is brought forth, on the other hand, from a designing process that, as 
such, employs not the methods of inquiry but the methods of design-making.  
For the purposes of enfranchised design research, this second process need not 
necessarily be described in detail. In this regard, Mattelmäki and Matthews 
(2009, p.5) cite the following example: “In Matthews et al. (2008), the process 
of the design of the tiles is entirely absent to the account (and inconsequential 
to the argument), since products-in-use are all that is required to make the 
points they argue.” When the research question is about the designing process 
and the tools employed therein, however, describing that process naturally 
becomes indispensable. 
Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson’s second criterion is that the research’s output 
be significant invention. This is also a necessary feature for selection inside the 
GAS, because no one will rely on the uncertain durability of knowledge claims 
that merely say the same thing as already existing claims. We consider this 
criterion especially useful to apply to an artefact produced by research through 
design, because it means that the researcher-designer has to make an argument 
why the research advances the current state of the art in the research 
community by specifying what design issue was dealt with and how it was 
resolved. This is an essential step because, as Stappers (2007, p.87) states, the 
artefacts “embody solutions, but the problems they solve may not be 
recognized.” Therefore, it is important that the researcher explicitly declare the 
claimed advance both vis-à-vis solutions already on the market and vis-à-vis 
solutions that might be proposed by other research. This is prerequisite for 
allowing the gatekeepers of the GAS tank, first of all, and all the other 
researchers who come upon the solution later to gauge the relative significance 
of the innovation and thus the foreseeable duration of the knowledge claim. 
The above holds true if the research through design focuses on the design 
outcome. When, on the other hand, it focuses on establishing new tools for 
designing (hence on how rather than what the designer designs), the invention 
will amount to a theoretical contribution or a proposal of new design methods.  
In this regard, we may refer to the newness of the knowledge contribution, just 
as in other disciplines. Mattelmäki and Matthews (2009, 4) cite a research 
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project whose aim was to evaluate the various facets of design probes as a tool: 
“The role of designing in the cases appeared in the customizing of the probes 
experiments, in designing the probes kits and ‘communicational’ artifacts as 
design objects. Design skills were also applied in seeking [...] design 
opportunities and elaborating alternative solutions in several cases.” In such a 
case, the design outcome may actually not represent a significant invention vis-
à-vis the state of the art but nevertheless prove useful for explaining how 
certain solutions emerged through specific design processes or through reliance 
on particular design methods. 
The third criterion is relevance, i.e. the impact a given research outcome is 
expected to have on the world. In the context of scientific research, the foreseen 
impact of certain outcomes has increasingly become a key factor in distributing 
resources (research grants etc.) in recent decades. Anyway, the relevance of a 
knowledge claim is certainly a factor favouring selection in the GAS, if by 
‘relevance’ we mean it being in the focus of interest of a research community.  
No matter how clever or innovative a discovery is, it is fated to lie dormant in 
the silt of the GAS tank if no one takes an interest in it. Applying relevance to 
research through design means that the design process should deal with an 
actual problem by envisioning a preferred state of affairs. The design outcome 
and the explicit knowledge generated ought thus to meet a real need on the part 
of society, users, companies, designers or some such target. This is the reason a 
lot of design research tackles issues universally considered ‘socially relevant,’ 
such as environmental sustainability or healthcare.  
The fourth and last criterion applied by Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson is 
extensibility, which is to say the chance that others may use the knowledge 
outcome of the research. This corresponds to Merton’s imperative of communism 
(1968, p.610), which is to say the publication of research results, without which 
Western science could not have begotten the GAS. We may add that 
extensibility can take place only if knowledge output has been properly conveyed 
as an explicit claim of knowledge. This is the prerequisite for research results, 
once they have been admitted to the fluid dynamics of the GAS, to be employed 
by others. Two suitable examples are Xerox’s work on the interaction design of 
reprographics machines cited by Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson (2007, 
p.500) and “Vision of the Future” by Philips Design (Lambourne, Feiz and Rigot 
1997). These two research through design projects broadly influenced design 
culture on all levels, and they have been widely cited. The extensibility of 
results, which partly depends on being distributed through ‘scientific’ research 
channels, is a determining factor for research output to be deemed ‘knowledge.’ 
5 CONCLUSION 
Design and design research are different frames of activity. We have argued that 
design research can be truly specific to the design discipline only when designing 
is one of its tools. For this is the platform on which design, while remaining a 
planning endeavor, may at the same time become an act of producing new 
knowledge. This is the case of research through design. 
We have considered that, in order to assure the quality of research results, 
design research has often run the risk of taking up the scientific methods of 
other disciplines, without stopping to consider why such methods are considered 
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‘scientific’ there. This could lead to a kind of ‘colonization of design discourse’ 
(Krippendorff).  
To fully understand why scientific research employs codified methods, we 
analyzed scientists’ practice of publishing the results of their research. This has 
served to clarify that what determines whether research findings are valid is not 
the method in itself but the consensus of a community. Equally, what makes a 
designer’s work research is not just having applied codified methods but also 
participating in the game of the Great Archive of Science (GAS), whose laws 
know how to select, from countless claims of knowledge, a relatively 
circumscribed corpus of durable knowledge. In our view, knowledge claims 
based on research through design should consist of a design outcome equipped 
with an explicit declaration of the features that make it a new, valid, and 
trustworthy piece of knowledge. Indeed, neither a mere design outcome nor 
purely verbal knowledge claims suffice to qualify a design activity as design 
research. 
Finally, we sought to identify the criteria needed to a design project to 
legitimately aspire to be deemed design research. Four criteria drawn from 
literature appeared to be relevant: reliability (by process recounting), originality, 
relevance and extensibility. According to the dynamics of the GAS, respecting 
the first three criteria would make it easier for a claim of knowledge obtained 
during research through design to be admitted to the GAS. Its chances of 
remaining afloat in the fluid dynamics of the GAS will be directly proportional to 
the extensibility of the findings, i.e. to the likelihood that others take up as their 
own the knowledge claims it avers. 
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